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The asset allocation is a crucial decision for pension funds, and this paper
analyses the economic factors which determine this choice. The analysis proceeds
on the basis that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance,
the asset allocation between equities and bonds is indeterminate and governed by
the risk-return preferences of the trustees and the employer. If the employing
company and its shareholders are subject to taxation, there is a tax advantage in
a largely bond allocation. Risk sharing between the employer and the employees
often means that one group favours a high equity allocation, while the other
favours a low equity allocation. Underpriced default insurance creates an
incentive for a high equity allocation. When taxation, risk sharing and
underpriced default insurance are all present it is concluded that the appropriate
asset allocation varies with the circumstances of the scheme; but that a high
equity allocation is probably inappropriate for many private sector pension
schemes. 
Key words: pension fund, asset allocation, tax arbitrage, risk sharing, default insurance,
embedded options1 Time diversification occurs when over and under performance tends to cancel
out in the long run.
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The main determinant of the investment performance of a pension fund is the asset allocation,
rather than the stock selection (Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann, 1999; Brinson, Hood and
Beebower, 1986; Brinson, Singer and Beebower, 1991; and Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000). This
paper concentrates on the equity-bond decision, but the arguments can be generalised to include
other asset classes. There is a considerable amount of evidence that in competitive capital
markets additional risk is compensated by additional expected returns (e.g. the equity risk
premium) Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, 2002; Cornell, 1999; and Siegel, 2002. There is also
evidence that time diversification
1 is not present for equities (Sutcliffe, 2004). Therefore, in both
the long and the short run, there is a linear trade-off between risk and return, as in the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964), and equities are not relatively more attractive for long term
investors. There is empirical evidence that equities are not a good hedge for pension scheme
liabilities, and so there is no particular hedging advantage in equities over other forms of
investment (Sutcliffe, 2004). In these circumstances (and in the absence of taxation, risk sharing
and default insurance), the asset allocation decision depends on the risk-return preferences of the
trustees, in consultation with the employer. A high equity proportion leads to a high risk, high
expected return outcome; while a low equity proportion gives a low risk, low expected return
outcome.
This paper relies on higher expected returns from equities being offset by the higher risks, equity
having no special hedging merits, and the absence of a reduction in equity risk for long run
investors. It proceeds on the premise that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default
insurance, the asset allocation is indeterminate. Section 1 considers the effects of introducing
taxation on the asset allocation, section 2 analyses the consequences of recognising that risks are
shared between the employer and the employees, while section 3 examines the consequences of
introducing default insurance. Section 4 presents the implications for the asset allocation of
various combinations of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance. Finally, section 5 has the2
conclusions. 
1. Taxation Arbitrage
The taxation effect only applies to companies which pay tax on their profits, and does not apply
when the employer is not subject to corporate taxation, e.g. local authorities, universities, public
utilities (for example, coal, electricity, post, gas, transport, airways, civil aviation), churches,
charities, state-owned broadcasters, etc. Therefore, tax arbitrage is not relevant to many large
pension schemes. 
Assuming that the earnings of the pension fund are tax exempt, while contributions to the fund
by the employer are tax deductible, and there are no transactions costs; there are two situations
in which there is a tax arbitrage gain from switching the investment of a pension fund from
equities to bonds. The first situation was analysed by Tepper (1981) (see also Bader, 2003, and
Frank, 2002); while the second was analysed by Black (1980) (see also Black & Dewhurst, 1981,
Ralfe, Speed and Palin, 2003, Surz, 1981, Frank, 2002, Tepper and Affleck, 1974, and
Alexander, 2002). 
Both models assume that the pension scheme will not default, the employer owns any surplus on
the scheme, and that the pension scheme is viewed as an integral part of the employer. The Black
model assumes that the capital market equates the gross risk-adjusted returns on bonds and
equity; i.e. the world assumed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), where the tax deductibility of
interest payments creates an incentive for companies to use primarily debt finance. The Tepper
model follows Miller (1977) and assumes that it is net risk-adjusted returns for bonds and
equities which are equal, and so there is no benefit from companies using debt finance. If the
marginal investor is tax exempt, for both the Modigliani and Miller and Miller worlds, there is
no benefit to using debt finance (Frank, 2002).
Tepper. In this case the pension scheme switches from equities to debt, effectively lowering the2 The values of ts and tb will differ between individuals, and the appropriate rates
are those for the marginal investor.
3 This assumes that the employer has taxable earnings in excess of their pension
contributions.
4 This switch from equities to bonds effectively lowers the gearing of the
employer. However in the world of Miller this has no effect on the employer’s net cost of
capital.
3
gearing of the employer (which is integrated with the pension scheme). At the same time the
shareholders in the employer borrow money and invest the proceeds in equities with the same
expected returns and systematic risk as shares in the employer. Provided the rate of personal
taxation on income from equities (ts) is higher than the rate of personal taxation on income from
bonds (tb), there is a tax benefit to the shareholders from this strategy
2. The two steps of the
Tepper strategy will now be described in more detail.
A. The pension fund is fully invested in equities, which it sells; investing the proceeds in bonds.
Let the value of the pension fund be F, the expected gross return on equities be E[Re] and the
expected gross return on bonds be E[Rb]. The resulting reduction in the expected revenue of the
fund is F(E[Rb]!E[Re]). A change of £1 in the revenue of the fund is equivalent to a change of
only (1!tc)£1 in the earnings of the employer because the employer must pay tax at the rate of
tc on earnings
3. Therefore the switch from equities to bonds by the pension fund is equivalent to
a reduction in the earnings of the employer of F(E[Rb]!E[Re])(1!tc). Such a decrease in net
profits by the employer is passed on to the shareholders, who pay tax at the rate ts, so that the net
loss to the shareholders is F(E[Rb]!E[Re])(1!tc)(1!ts)
4.
B. At the same time as the fund switches from equities to bonds, the shareholders borrow F(1!tc)
at the expected rate E[Rb] and invest the proceeds in equities with an expected return and
systematic risk which is the same as that of shares in the employer. Assuming that the interest
payments by the shareholder are tax deductible, the change in the net revenue of the shareholders
is F(1!tc){E[Re](1!ts)!E[Rb](1!tb)}.5 Even if the employer pays a higher rate on the debt it issues (Y) than the fund
receives on the bonds in which it invests (R), the strategy is still worthwhile provided R <
Y/(1!tc), Alexander (2002).
6 This assumes that the employer has sufficient equity capital available to be
repurchased. If the employer purchases shares in other companies with the same expected
return and systematic risk as its own equity, any taxes on these returns reduce the tax
arbitrage gain. It also assumes that there are no transactions costs from issuing the bonds, the
purchasers of the bonds require no risk premium for the possibility that the pension fund may
switch back to investing in equities, and no risk premium for their inability to claim the assets
4
The total net change in the revenues of shareholders from steps A and B is F(E[Rb]!E[Re])×
(1!tc)(1!ts)+F(1!tc){E[Re](1!ts)!E[Rb](1!tb)} = F(1!tc)E[Rb](tb!ts). Provided that tb > ts, the
shareholders gain this amount each year in perpetuity. The present value to the shareholders of
the profit stream from this tax arbitrage (discounting at the after-tax bond rate (1!tc)E[Rb]
because this gain is riskless) is F(tb!ts). 
Black. As for Tepper, the pension scheme switches from equities to bonds, effectively lowering
the gearing of the employer (which is assumed to be integrated with the pension scheme). In the
world of Modigliani and Miller, as the level of debt is increased, the employer gains. The
employer can either benefit from a lower cost of capital, or restore their initial level of gearing
and enjoy a tax gain because interest payments are tax deductible, while payments to
shareholders are not. These two steps will now be explained.
A. The pension fund is fully invested in equities, which it sells; investing the proceeds in bonds.
As for Tepper, the net cost to the employer of this switch is F(E[Rb]!E[Re])(1!tc).
B. The employer issues debt to raise the sum F(1!tc), and the interest on this debt has a gross cost
to the firm of F(1!tc)E[Rb] per year, where the firm’s bonds are assumed to pay the same rate of
interest as the bonds held by the pension fund
5. The money raised from issuing this debt is used
to buy back an equivalent value of the employer’s shares, leading to a reduction in the gross cost
of equity capital to the employer of F(1!tc)E[Re] per year
6. Hence the reduction in the gross costof the pension scheme if the employer goes bankrupt, Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew
and Shevlin (2001).
7 However, substantially over-funding the scheme brings the risks of hitting the
Inland Revenue upper limit on the funding ratio (see section 2), and pressure to grant
substantial benefit improvements out of the large surplus.
8 Thomas (1988) finds empirical evidence for the USA that, if the employer’s
marginal tax rate or expected future taxable income change over time, this leads to a change
in the level of contributions and the funding ratio in order to maximise the tax benefits.
9 In the USA when the upper funding ratio is hit, further contributions to the
fund are restricted; but there is no requirement to reduce the surplus, as in the UK. Ippolito
(1990) shows that this situation provides an incentive for funds to invest in equities in order
to generate an even larger surplus, before the fund is switched to bonds.
10 The desire by companies to hold financial slack may also lead to over-funding,
Myers and Majluf (1984). Datta, Iskander-Datta and Zychowicz (1996) found US evidence
supporting the hypothesis that the financial slack motive for over-funding is strengthened
when the managers of the employer do not own shares in the company.
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of capital to the employer is F(1!tc)(E[Re]!E[Rb]) per year. 
Using the assumptions of Modigliani and Miler, the reduction in the gross cost of capital to the
employer equals the increased cost of funding the pension scheme caused by its switch from
equities to bonds. However, there is a tax gain to the employer, because the interest paid by the
company on its new debt is tax deductible, while payments to shareholders are not. The overall
net gain to the employer from this strategy is F(1!tc){E[Re]!E[Rb](1!tc)}+F{E[Rb]
!E[Re]}(1!tc) = F(1!tc)E[Rb])tc per year. The present value of this perpetuity (discounted at the
after-tax riskless rate) is Ftc. 
This analysis shows that for both the Tepper and Black models the larger is the value of the
pension fund (F), the greater is the tax arbitrage gain
7. This implies that schemes adopting either
the Tepper or Black strategies should also seek to fund their schemes up to the maximum level
permitted by the tax authorities
8 
9 
10. 11 An empirical study of US pension schemes by Frank (2002) found support for
the Black model, which is consistent with Graham (2000) who presents evidence for the USA
in support of the Modigliani and Miller world, and therefore the Black model. 
12 The size of the Boots share buy-back was set on advice from the credit rating
agencies.
13 Making this risk return trade-off requires the scheme to estimate the segment
of their asset-liability efficient frontier that is dominated by the risk-minimising portfolio.
14 UK pension schemes in aggregate have high equity allocations, and those with
corporate employers have not pursued a tax-arbitrage strategy. For the Black model this may
be for the reasons mentioned above by Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew & Shevlin (2001),
or because the employer has insufficient taxable profits to offset the bond interest payments,
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The Tepper and Black models deal with different worlds. The Tepper strategy (which applies in
the Modigliani and Miller world) produces a gain with a present value of F(tb!ts), while the Black
strategy (which applies in the Miller world) gives a gain of Ftc
11. If the corporate tax rate is 30%,
the present value of the tax arbitrage gain from the Black strategy will be substantial at 30% of
the value of the fund. Therefore, tax arbitrage can provide a powerful reason for company
pension schemes to switch the fund to bonds. This is illustrated by the example of Boots. As well
as switching the pension fund into 100% bonds, Boots bought back £300 million of its own
shares using available cash. This is the tax arbitrage strategy of Black, except that the share buy-
back should have been almost four times larger
12. The estimated present value of the tax gain to
Boots from this capital restructuring is £100 million (Ralfe, Speed and Palin, 2003). 
Tax arbitrage generates a gain for the firm’s shareholders, while the pension scheme is now less
likely to default as it is 100% bonds. Therefore, such a switch should benefit both the employer
and the employees, and there should not be any conflict between these groups in making the asset
allocation decision. The tax arbitrage case for an all-bond portfolio assumes that the risk-
minimising portfolio is all bonds, although this may not be the case. The all-bond portfolio may
be inefficient, and a small proportion of equities may be beneficial by reducing risk and
increasing expected return. In these circumstances pension funds face a trade-off between risk
minimization and the tax arbitrage profits from holding 100% bonds
13 
14. This could lead to aor because the employer has insufficient share capital to buy-back. For both the Black and
Tepper models the employer must have sufficient profits to offset their contributions to the
fund; while if the risk-minimising portfolio includes an equity component, this may result in a
pension fund that is not 100% bonds. The Tepper argument for all bonds may not apply
because tb is not greater than ts, which has been argued to be the case for the USA by Chen
and Reichenstein (1992). Erickson, Goolsbee and Maydew (2003), who studied a different
form of tax arbitrage in the USA, found that the level of arbitrage activity could have been
about twenty times larger, and conclude that the lack of tax arbitrage is a puzzle. A similar
puzzle exists for Black and Tepper tax arbitrage.
15 In reality, there are additional features of the problem which mean that the
employees may bear a substantial share of the cost of a deficit, without the scheme being
wound up. A deficit can lead to the scheme being closed to new members or to additional
contributions. Benefits, other than those already accrued, can be reduced, the retirement age
can be increased, the accrual rate reduced and the employee contribution rate increased. In
addition, wages may be frozen, or increased at a lower rate for those in the pension scheme
(as did the Financial Services Authority in April 2003).
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small difference of opinion between the employer and the employees, but this may be resolved
by the employer offering a share of the tax arbitrage gain to the employees to compensate for the
increase in risk.
2. Risk Sharing
The risks and rewards from investing the pension fund do not concern solely the employer, but
are shared with the employees and pensioners. If the employer goes into liquidation, there may
be insufficient assets to meet the scheme’s liabilities, with the loss falling on the employees and
pensioners. Conversely, if the scheme has a substantial surplus, this may well be shared between
the employer, employees and pensioners via reduced contributions and increased benefits. In
these ways the employees and pensioners are exposed to the risks of the scheme
15.
The sharing of deficits and surpluses between the employer and the employees has been analysed
using option theory by Sharpe (1976). After explaining the Sharpe model, it will be extended by
relaxing a number of the underlying assumptions. In constructing his simple model Sharpe
assumes that the employer benefits from the full amount of any surplus, but is not liable for any16 These assumptions will be relaxed below.
17 It is also implicitly assumed that there are no pension scheme termination
costs, e.g. lawyers fees, poor labour relations, etc. Their presence makes a high equity
allocation less attractive.
18 Note that for European style options on non-dividend paying assets, unless A =
L(1+r), where r is the riskless rate of interest between now and expiry, C does not equal P.
19 If the employer is a public sector organization, it may be constrained by its
government funding, and seek to fix the total cost of employment.
20  The empirical evidence on the existence of a trade-off between pension
benefits and salaries is mixed. Gunderson, Hyatt and Pesando (1992) review this evidence,
and find five papers which support a trade-off, three papers with some evidence for a trade-
off, two papers that fail to find a trade-off, and three papers that find a positive relationship
between pensions and salaries.
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deficiency
16. He also assumes there is no taxation and no default insurance or compensation
17.
The pension scheme liabilities are valued at L, while the assets are valued at A, and so the value
of any scheme surplus or deficit is (A!L). Sharpe argues that, in effect, the employer has a long
position in a call option on the assets of the fund, with a strike price of L (i.e. the right to buy the
assets in the fund on payment of L). This call option is valued at C. The employees have the right
to receive their contractual pensions benefits (i.e. L), and have effectively sold a put option on
the assets of the fund with a strike price of L (i.e. they must supply the assets in the fund for L,
on request). This put option is valued at P. The European style put-call parity means that A =
C!P+L
18. 
By working for the employer, employees receive their pension entitlement (L) and their wages,
which have a present value of W. The employees have also accepted the obligation to bear any
scheme deficits, and this is valued by the put premium (P). Sharpe argues that in a competitive
labour market the sum of these three amounts will be a constant (K)
19, and so L!P+W = K
20.
Therefore, since A = C!P+L; it follows that K = W+A!C. This means that the fixed cost of
remuneration (K, or salary plus pension costs) equals the wage cost (W), plus the assets in the
fund (A), less the value of the call option on any surplus in the fund (C). Black and Scholes21 It also follows from the theory of option pricing that by reducing the funding
ratio, the value of the put option is increased, while the value of the call option is reduced.
22 The funding ratio is also indeterminate as an increase in L will be offset by an
increase in P and a reduction in C.
23 In this case, the asset allocation is the chosen point on the efficient frontier. If
a number of asset classes is under consideration (e.g. bonds, index-linked gilts, property, UK
equities, overseas equities, etc) an asset-liability study is needed to determine the efficient
frontier.
24 Sharpe’s model deals only with active members who can renegotiate their
wages as the scheme’s asset allocation is altered. Deferred members and pensioners have no
such sanction against an employer whose pension fund adopts a high equity allocation.
However, pensioners come before active members in the priority order for compensation on a
winding up, and so the greater is the liability to pensioners, the greater is the increase in risk 
borne by active members when the fund has a high equity allocation. Therefore, although the
problem is more complicated than presented by Sharpe, even for mature schemes, the Sharpe
model may be a reasonable approximation.
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(1973) have shown that the value of a European style call or put option depends on six variables -
the price of the underlying asset (A), the strike price of the option (L), the riskless interest rate
(r), dividends (which are zero in this case), the time to expiry of the option (t) and the volatility
of returns on the underlying asset (F). Sharpe then argues that, although a high equity allocation
increases the riskiness of returns on the pension fund (i.e. F) thereby increasing C and P; this will
be offset by a corresponding increase in either wages (W), or assets in the fund (A). Therefore,
a high equity allocation has no effect on the total cost of employee remuneration to the employer.
In Sharpe’s view pension “funding policy is irrelevant”
21 
22 
23 
24.
Sharpe’s simple model will be elaborated in three different ways. First, if total employee
remuneration is not fixed, the asset allocation is no longer irrelevant. Assuming that there is no
wages or funding level offset, a high equity allocation increases the volatility of the underlying
asset, and this increases the value of the put and call options. Given the assumptions of Sharpe
about how deficits and surpluses are shared, investment risk for the employer is a bet with the
characteristics of “heads I win, tails you lose”. Therefore a high equity allocation makes the25 This outcome is mentioned by Sherris (1992).
26 The variables d and s are in the zero-one range, and are assumed for the
moment to be known for certain.
27 It will be assumed for simplicity that the same values of s and d apply to both
active members and pensioners. However, given the priority order on a winding-up in the
Pensions Act 1995 (and the recently proposed government amendments), active members
bear much more of the default risk than do current pensioners. Therefore, pensioners have a
greater appetite for a high equity allocation than active members. Benefit increases may be
directed at active members, current pensioners, deferred pensioners, or all three groups. 
28 Until 2003, when a scheme was wound-up the employer only needed to ensure
the funding level was up to the MFR, and this may correspond to a funding ratio of only
about 70%. In consequence, the employees and pensioners could suffer the first 30% of any
under-funding. From 11
th June 2003 the UK government required employers to fully fund
schemes on a winding-up, Department for Work and Pensions (2003). This increased d.
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employees worse off, and the employer better off
25. 
Second, if total remuneration is not fixed and the employer bears a proportion of deficits (d),
while the employees receive a share (1!s) of any surplus; the situation becomes more complex
26
27 
28. If there is no offsetting, then employees’ total remuneration rises to K =
L!P(1!d)+C((1!s)+W, while the cost to the employer increases to K = W+A!Cs+Pd. Whether
a high equity allocation in this situation is beneficial to the employees or the employer depends
on the way in which K changes as the volatility of returns on the fund (F) changes. This depends
on the sign of MK/MF = M(L+W)/MF+(1!s)(MC/MF)!(1!d)(MP/MF), where MC/MF and MP/MF are,
by definition, the values of vega (<) for the call and put options, respectively. 
Using the Black-Scholes model, vega is a positive number which is the same for both put and call
options, and is given by < = A/t.exp(!D
2/2)/(2B)
0.5 where D = [ln(A/L) +(r+0.5F
2)t]/F/t. Since
the values of r, t, A, L and F are the same for both the call and put options, and total remuneration
is fully responsive, i.e. M(L+W)/MF = 0, then MK/MF = <(d!s). Provided that d > s, a high equity
allocation increases F, which increases K, making the employees better off and the employer
worse off. When s > d a high equity allocation leads to a reduction in K, and so the employer29 Conflict between the employer and the employees over the investment policy
of the fund is only important if neither party can make this decision acting alone. The
requirement by the Pensions Act 1995 for member nominated trustees from 1997 may have
increased the influence of employees on the asset allocation decision. However, whether or
not one group controls this decision depends on the rules of each scheme, and some schemes
allow the employer to set the contribution rate. Useem and Hess (2001) analysed the asset
allocation decisions of 253 of the largest US public pension schemes in 1992. They found that
the equity proportion was negatively related to investment restrictions, and positively related
to the existence of independent performance evaluation and the number of trustees. However,
the proportion of trustees elected by the members had no significant effect on the equity
proportions.
30 Ippolito (1985) shows that, if the labour force is unionised and the company
has a substantial investment in specialised capital equipment, the union may seek to increase
wages by threatening to strike. The employer can counter this threat by deliberately under-
funding the pension scheme. The employees now bear some of the risks of a strike which may
lead to the closure of the company and default on the pension scheme.
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gains, and the employees lose. For example, if the employing company is close to financial
distress, with a net asset value near zero, it may be in the interests of the shareholders of this
company to have a high equity allocation. If equities do well the net asset value of the company
increases because the value of the pension fund has increased. If equities do badly, the funding
ratio of the scheme deteriorates, leading to an increase in the contribution rate and the likely
liquidation of the employer. In this case all the outstanding obligations of the employer fall on
the creditors of the company, including the obligations to the pension scheme, Alexander (2002).
Therefore, when total remuneration is not fixed, surpluses and deficits are shared between the
employer and the employers on a simple proportionate basis, the Black-Scholes option pricing
model applies, and there are no tax arbitrage effects: (a) the interests of the employer and the
employees concerning a high equity allocation are directly opposed
29, and (b) whether it is the
employer or the employees who favour a high equity allocation depends on the relative
magnitudes of d and s
30. 
Over the past two decades, many pension schemes have granted substantial benefit
improvements, but no data is available on the cost of these improvements, as a proportion of the31 Inland Revenue web site.
32 The value of d may also be close to unity if there is some actual or implicit
guarantee (e.g. the government) in the event of a deficit on winding up. This situation will be
considered in section 3 on default insurance.
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surplus. However, there is information on the way in which surpluses are shared when schemes
breach the Revenue limit. Schemes whose funding ratio breaches the upper limit of 105% set by
the Inland Revenue for the retention of their tax exempt status, must reduce their surplus. For a
14 year period (1987 to 2001) the proportion of such required reductions in surplus received by
members was 34.4%, i.e. s = 0.656
31. For well-funded schemes with a large and successful
employer who is committed to the scheme, the value of d will be close to unity. Therefore, it is
probable that d > s, and a high equity allocation favours the employees at the expense of the
employer
32. However, if the employees receive a very small share of any surpluses, or the
employer may well default, then it is likely that s > d and the employees will be opposed to a
high equity allocation, while the employer will support a high equity allocation. 
A further complication of the second variant of the Sharpe model arises if there is a partial offset,
i.e. total remuneration responds to a change in the values of C and P, but by less than the full
amount because of a partial offset against wages or the funding level. In which case M(L+W)/MF
 0. In consequence, assuming that the degree of partial offset is the same for both surpluses and
deficits, the gains and losses are reduced in size by the partial offset, but the result that the
employees favour a high equity allocation when d > s (and vice versa) is unaffected.
In the final variation of the Sharpe model it is again assumed that total remuneration (K) is fixed,
while deficits and surpluses are shared in some way, and any gains or losses to the employees and
employer from a high equity allocation are offset by changes in wages or the level of funding.
In such circumstances the asset allocation again becomes irrelevant.
The various situations analysed above are summarised in table 1. In each case a high equity33 The second situation, with d = 0 and s = 1, is a special case of s > d, where K
is variable.
34 The simple Sharpe model (d = 0 and s = 1) is a special case of d and s in the
zero-one range, where K is fixed.
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allocation is a zero sum game. A likely situation is a strong probability that the employer will not
wind up the scheme in a deficit situation (so that d is close to unity), surpluses are shared
(possibly s = b) and total remuneration (K) is variable. In these circumstance d > s, and the
employees favour a high equity allocation, while the employer favours bonds. This is because
a high equity allocation now offers the employees a “heads I win, tails you lose” bet. If equities
perform well, the employees receive substantial benefit improvements, while if equities perform
badly, the costs are very largely met by the employer. However, because they bear most of the
risk of deficits, but receive only a proportion of the surpluses, employers favour the risk-
minimising portfolio. When total remuneration is fixed, the asset allocation is unaffected by the
values of d and s. If total remuneration can vary, the funding decision only requires the estimation
of the relative size of two parameters, d and s. It does not require the valuation of the implicit put
and call options, the degree of partial offset, or the value of vega.
The Sharpe Model and its Three Variants
1 2 0.125 3B
33 4
34
K Fixed Variable Variable Variable Fixed
d and s d=0, s=1 d=0, s=1 d > s s > d 1$d$0,1$s$0
Employer Irrelevant High Equity Low Equity High Equity Irrelevant
Employees Irrelevant Low Equity High Equity Low Equity Irrelevant
Table 1: Summary of the Various Combinations of Total Remuneration and Risk Sharing
Two generalizations of the various Sharpe models will now be considered. The first involves the
implicit assumption concerning diversifiable risk. A high equity allocation increases the volatility
of the assets, and this increased risk is shared in different ways between the employees and the
employer. It has been assumed so far that these changes in risk are reflected in the value of the
put and call options, and no further consideration need be given to this risk. For a corporate
employer this may be a reasonable assumption as the company’s shareholders are assumed to
have well diversified portfolios, and the increase in the systematic risk of their personal portfolios35 If there was a mass switch by all UK companies to a high equity allocation,
then the exposure of every company to the stock market would be increased, and the resulting
increase in systematic risk would be more substantial.
36 Note that this problem applies to both corporate and non-corporate employers.
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due to one company having a high equity allocation for its pension fund is small
35. Where the
employer is not a company, it is likely that the increased exposure to systematic risk will again
be small. However, for employees the situation is probably different. The risk of the pension
scheme defaulting is strongly positively correlated with the risk of the employees losing their job
with the employer, Alexander (2002), Ralfe, Speed and Palin (2003)
36. Therefore, so far as the
portfolio of each employee is concerned, there is minimal diversification for the risk of highly
negative outcomes for both pensions and employment. For most people, their pension and
employment are major components of their wealth, and it may be unwise to create a situation in
which the value of both of these important assets drops sharply when their employer fails. 
Employees may require additional total remuneration of R as compensation for each increase of
unity in risk (F ) (in the form of higher wages, a higher share of surpluses, a lower share of the
deficits, etc). In this case the situation is no longer zero-sum, and some of the results in table 1
are altered. The first and last cases in table 1 now require the employer to increase total
remuneration as equity risk is increased, which implies that the employer now favours the risk-
minimising portfolio, as this has the lowest cost. For case 2 in table 1 some of the gains to the
employer from a high equity allocation are now shared with the employees via R, but the
strategies for the employer and employees are unchanged. In the third case in table 1 the
employees favour a high equity allocation if <(d!s)+R > 0, while the employer favours a high
equity allocation if <(d!s)+R < 0. Making these judgements requires a knowledge of both vega
and R, in addition to d and s. The revised results when non-diversifiable risk is recognised are
set out in table 2.37 If the total value of wages and pensions benefits is fixed, this incomplete
contracts risk only involves the form of remuneration, not its magnitude.
38 Since the actual values of d and s may be substantially under the control of the
employer, it is likely that the standard deviations of these distributions are smaller for the
employer than for the employees. 
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The Sharpe Model and its Three Variants
1 2 0.125 3B 4
K Fixed Variable Variable Variable Fixed
d and s d=0, s=1 d=0, s=1 <(d!s)+R > 0 <(d!s)+R < 0 1$d$0, 1$s$0
Non-
diversifiable
risk (R)
Employer Low Equity High Equity Low Equity High Equity Low Equity
Employees Irrelevant Low Equity High Equity Low Equity Irrelevant
d and s risk
(FK) and R
Employer Low Equity ? Low Equity ? Low Equity
Employees Irrelevant Low Equity ? Low Equity Irrelevant
Table 2: Summary of the Various Combinations of Total Remuneration and Risk Sharing
When there is Non-Diversifiable Risk and d and s are Risky 
The second generalization of the Sharpe model concerns the way in which deficits and surpluses
are shared between the employer and the employees. This has previously been assumed to be
clearly specified in advance, i.e. d and s are certain. However, in reality this is seldom the case.
For example, when the scheme shows a big surplus, the employer may just reduce the employer’s
contribution rate, with no benefit improvements for the employees. Therefore, the employer and
employees have entered into a risky contract where the division of the payoffs between them (d
and s) has not been clearly defined in advance, i.e. they have entered into an incomplete contract.
This makes it more difficult to assess the costs and benefits from a high equity allocation because
an additional layer of risk is present
37. This risk leads to a strengthening of the argument against
a high equity allocation.
If the values of d and s are risky, the employer and employees will form their own expectations
of the distributions of s and d
38. The single decision variable, total remuneration (K), is replaced
by four variables:- expected total remuneration E[K] and its risk FK for both the employer and
the employees. When K is variable, its risk increases as the fund moves into equities. The four
cases in table 2 will be re-considered under the assumption that both the employer and the39 Apart from the effects of an increase in FK as the fund switches into equities.
40 The implication of conflict over the asset allocation for the schemes of non-
corporate employers with variable remuneration is not borne out in practice. Bunt,
Winterbotham and Williams (1998) report that the trustees of UK schemes nearly always
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employees are risk averse. In cases 1 and 4 it is assumed that FK = 0, and so there is no change
in the previous conclusions. For case 3B (which subsumes case 2), a high equity allocation
lowers E[K] and increases FK, and for both these reasons, is opposed by the employees. For the
employer, there is a trade-off between the increase in E[K] and the increase in FK, and they may
or may not support a high equity allocation. For case 3A, a high equity allocation leads to an
increase in E[K] as well as an increase in FK, and so is opposed by the employer. The employees
now have a trade-off between the increase in E[K] and the increase in FK, and they may support
or oppose a high equity allocation. The conclusions when d and s are risky and there is non-
diversifiable risk (R > 0) are summarised in table 2. Since FK increases as the fund switches more
money into equities, the asset allocation may be a mixture of equities and bonds at the point
where the additional benefits to the employer or employees from greater equity investment equal
the additional costs from the increased risk.
In the absence of underpriced default insurance and corporation tax, there appear to be two
situations in which a pension fund will adopt a high equity allocation. First, if total remuneration
is variable, v(d!s)+R > 0, and the employees determine the investment policy and have a low
level of risk aversion. Second, if total remuneration is variable, v(d!s)+R < 0, and the employer
determines the investment policy and has a low level of risk aversion.
Overall, the conclusions are that, if total remuneration (K) is fixed, the employer prefers the risk-
minimising portfolio, while the employees are indifferent to the asset allocation. If K is variable,
the choice of asset allocation is a zero-sum game
39 between the employer and employees, with
one favouring the risk-minimising portfolio while the other party may or may not support a high
equity allocation, depending on the values of d, s, R, < and their degree of risk aversion
40.make decisions on a consensual basis, and voting is rare. Pratten and Satchell (1998) found a
similar situation for investment decisions. Since trustees are required to act in the best
interests of the beneficiaries of the trust, it is possible that employer trustees promote the
interests of the employees, and so there is no conflict over the asset allocation policy.
41 If both the employer and the employees are exposed to default risk; while only
one party pays the insurance premium, the party that pays the premium will lose out from the
introduction of correctly priced default insurance.
42 However, the introduction of default insurance removes the efficacy of an
under-funded pension scheme in deterring strikes for higher wages, Ippolito (1985).
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3. Default Insurance
In the USA the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 created the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC provides insurance against default by US
pension schemes. The UK has never had any default insurance scheme (although the Pension
Compensation Scheme was set up by the Pensions Act, 1995, to deal with cases of fraud), and
so this factor cannot have affected the high equity allocation in the UK. However, in June 2003
the UK government announced the establishment of a Pension Protection Fund, which may be
modelled on the PBGC. Therefore, the effects of default insurance may soon be important to UK
pension schemes.
Sharpe (1976) suggests that the PBGC can be viewed as providing the employer with a put
option. If the insurance premium to the PBGC is paid by the employer and equals the value of
the put option, the cost of default in Sharpe’s original model has been transferred from the
employees to the employer
41. Since no other aspect of Sharpe’s simple model has changed, the
introduction of correctly priced full default insurance should have no overall effect; other than
to make the employees better off and the employer worse off, and so the asset allocation remains
irrelevant, as does the funding ratio
42. However, in two respects, the PBGC has operated in a
different manner to that assumed by Sharpe. The PBGC insures only part of any default, and the
premiums were simply a flat fee per member until 1987, when fees were varied with the degree
of under-funding. However, PBGC fees do not reflect the solvency of the employer or the asset
allocation of the fund. Partial default insurance just means that some of the risk of default43 The lower is the funding ratio, the more likely is the scheme to benefit from
the default insurance, giving an incentive to reduce the funding ratio to the minimum
permitted level.
44 Bulow (1981) mentions that the tax benefits might be achieved by fully
funding the scheme using an all-bond portfolio. The default insurance benefits are then
obtained by adding a derivative overlay (e.g. index options, index futures or index swaps)
which increases the exposure of the fund to the stock market to the selected level. However,
this strategy is not attractive because it leaves the employer (which is assumed to be
integrated with the pension scheme) with a high level of risk.
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continues to be borne by the employees, and is of no great significance. The failure to correctly
price the default insurance to accurately reflect the increase in risk as the scheme switches to
risky investments, means that the employer and employees have an incentive to either adopt a
high equity allocation or, if it were possible, leave the default insurance scheme to avoid cross-
subsidizing other schemes that are highly risky
43. Therefore, underpriced default insurance has
created an incentive for a high equity allocation in the USA since 1974. Whether the introduction
of default insurance in the UK has a similar outcome depends on the way the insurance is priced.
4. Combining Taxation Arbitrage, Risk Sharing and Default Insurance
Tax arbitrage provides a strong case for company schemes adopting an all-bond portfolio and
funding the scheme up to the Revenue limit. Risk sharing means that usually one group
(employer or employees) will support a high equity allocation, while the other group will oppose
this asset allocation. Finally, underpriced default insurance provides an incentive for a high
equity allocation and reduce the funding ratio to the minimum permitted. This section considers
the likely outcome when schemes are exposed to various combinations of these conflicting
factors.
4a. Taxation Arbitrage and Default Insurance. Bicksler and Chen (1985) considered the
combined effects of the tax arbitrage and default insurance factors. These two factors imply that
the investment strategy of the fund is a corner solution: either all bonds or all equities
44. A similar
conclusion was reached by Harrison and Sharpe (1983) and Marcus (1987). However, the actual45 For example, Bodie, Light, Mørck & Taggart (1985, 1987) studied data on 939
US pension funds for 1980. They found that the asset allocation followed a bimodal
distribution, as predicted; and that one mode was 100% in bonds. However, the other mode
was only 55% in equities. Papke (1992) analysed 1987 data on the asset allocation of more
than 24,000 US defined benefit single employer pension schemes. He found considerable
variety in their asset allocations, and little evidence of all-bond or all-equity allocations.
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behaviour of pension funds in the US which have underpriced default insurance lies somewhere
between these two extremes
45. Bicksler and Chen (1985) explain the presence of such interior
solutions by the introduction of market imperfections. Although the scheme is insured, the
employer may experience pension termination costs (e.g. large legal expenses, poor labour
relations, problems obtaining tax exempt status for a subsequent pension scheme, etc). These
costs make default costly to the employer (and probably also the employees). If there are
progressive corporate tax rates, then as the pension fund switches more and more money into
equities and issues corporate bonds (following the Black, 1980, strategy), the tax gain to the
employer gets smaller and smaller because the company’s marginal tax rate gets lower and lower.
There is also the problem that in some years the company may not have any taxable income
against which to offset the interest it pays on the bonds it has issued. While such tax credits may
be carried forwards or backwards, this may result in a reduction in the present value of the tax
deduction. Therefore, the marginal benefits from tax arbitrage decrease as the fund switches most
of its money into bonds. Provided the tax and default insurance effects are of broadly similar size,
Bicksler and Chen (1985) argue that these market imperfections are responsible for the mixtures
of bonds and equities that prevail in practice. Another reason for deviating from the all-bond
portfolio is that the risk-minimising portfolio contains a small proportion of equities, and an all-
bond portfolio is inefficient.
4b. Taxation Arbitrage and Risk Sharing. In the UK there is no default insurance, and the only
interaction that currently matters is between tax arbitrage and risk sharing. The four possibilities
are summarised in table 3. If the employer does not pay corporation tax, tax arbitrage is
irrelevant, and the asset allocation is determined by risk sharing. If total remuneration is fixed
the employer will oppose a high equity allocation because it introduces d and s risk, while the20
all-bond portfolio is excluded because it is inefficient. If total remuneration is variable, then the
asset allocation is a zero-sum game (ignoring the effects of FK) between the employer and the
employees. The outcome will probably not be 100% bonds, because this portfolio is inefficient;
and will not be 100% equities, as this portfolio has the highest probability of incurring pension
termination costs. An all-equity portfolio may also be ruled out by the increasing level of total
remuneration risk (FK) outweighing the benefits from an increasing or decreasing level of E[K].
K Non-company Company
Fixed
There is no tax benefit from bonds, and the employer
opposes a high equity allocation because of the d and
s risk which a high equity allocation introduces. The
all-bond portfolio is ruled out because it is inefficient.
Very largely bonds, but with some
equity for risk-minimising reasons.
Variable
There is no tax benefit from bonds, and it is a zero-sum
game between the employer and the employees (apart
from  FK). Equity investment, beyond that for risk-
minimising reasons, depends on circumstances,
including  d, s, R, v and risk aversion.
Very largely bonds because the tax
arbitrage profits to the employer can be
used to offset the attractions of equities
to themselves, or the employees.
Table 3: Total Remuneration, Corporate Status and Investment Policy
If the employer pays corporation tax and can obtain a substantial tax arbitrage profit from an all-
bond portfolio, some of this arbitrage profit can be used to either (a) compensate the employees
for accepting an all-bond portfolio, or (b) change the balance of advantage to the employer away
from a preference for a high equity allocation to an all-bond portfolio. Again, because the all-
bond portfolio is probably not efficient, there may be a small percentage of equities in the chosen
portfolio. Thus, in a situation where the tax arbitrage and risk sharing factors both operate, the
asset allocation is likely to be predominantly bonds, but not 100% bonds. 
The funding ratio is one of the variables in the risk sharing model, with a lower funding ratio
increasing the risks of a deficit. Therefore, when there is just risk sharing, the funding ratio is part
of the bargain between the employer and the employees. But for corporate employers, and in the
absence of underpriced default insurance, the benefits from tax arbitrage indicate moving to the
maximum allowable funding ratio.21
4c. Risk Sharing and Default Insurance. Underpriced default insurance creates an incentive for
a high equity allocation, subject to pension termination costs. In the basic Sharpe model the costs
of default to the employees are greatly reduced by default insurance (correctly priced or
otherwise), and the value of the put option tends to zero. This affects the condition that L!P+W
= K, which is also affected by the inclusion of the costs of deposit insurance (D); assumed to be
paid by the employees since they receive the benefits. If the default insurance is correctly priced,
the value of the reduction in P equals D, and the net effect on the employees is zero, as it is on
the employers. However, if the default insurance is underpriced, the employees gain, leading to
a decrease in W. According to the basic Sharpe model, the asset allocation remains indeterminate.
If total remuneration is not fixed and deficits are shared, the gain from underpriced default
insurance (whether paid by the employer or the employees) is shared between them. However,
provided d is unchanged, the conflict between the employer and employees over the asset
allocation is unchanged. Since the gains from underpriced default insurance rise with a higher
equity allocation, there is tendency for those who benefit from these gains to increase the extent
to which they favour equities. This increases the likelihood of a high equity allocation.
4d Taxation Arbitrage, Risk Sharing and Default Insurance. When all three factors are present,
it has been argued above that the dominant effects are tax arbitrage and default insurance, and
so the analysis in section 4a is appropriate. Risk sharing adds the possibility that the main
beneficiary from tax arbitrage gains (the employer) or underpriced default insurance (the
employees) can compensate the other group to accept their preferred asset allocation; so
removing any conflict over the asset allocation.
5. Conclusions
In the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance the asset allocation of pension funds
is set using the risk and return preferences of the employer and employees, and these may vary
from scheme to scheme. When present, these three factors can have a powerful influence on the
optimal asset allocation. The interaction of tax arbitrage and risk sharing is shown to lead to four22
main possibilities, and while a wide range of asset allocations is possible; the risk-minimising
portfolio of largely bonds appears to be the most likely decision for the majority of pension
schemes in the private sector. If underpriced default insurance is added, the pull towards an all-
bond allocation is reduced. 
Since most UK pension funds have a substantial equity allocation, these conclusions are in sharp
contrast to actual asset allocation decisions. One response to this puzzle is that pension funds
make optimal decisions, and the model needs to be modified so that it can explain this behaviour.
Another response is to argue that many pension funds make sub-optimal asset allocation
decisions. The absence to date of powerful rational arguments supporting the widespread pursuit
of high equity proportions leaves the sub-optimal decision making explanation. However, further
research is needed on the asset allocation puzzle and why many pension funds make what appear
to be sub-optimal asset allocation decisions.
If the sub-optimal decision making view is accepted, the implication is that many pension funds
should hold substantially lower proportions of their assets in equities. In these circumstances,
funds should adopt the risk-minimising portfolio; with an asset-liability study to discover this
risk-minimising portfolio. The scheme can then determine the extent to which it wishes to
increase the bond proportion to achieve tax arbitrage profits (if available), or increase the equity
proportion to increase the fund’s risks and expected returns and the gains from underpriced
default insurance. If total remuneration is variable, and the employer is not a corporation, it is
more likely there will be conflicting views from the employer and the employees over the
appropriate asset allocation. 
Some implications from the analysis in this paper are that (a) company pension schemes should
have a lower proportion of their funds invested in equities than the schemes of non-corporate
employers, (b) there should be little conflict over the asset allocation decision in company
pension schemes, with more conflict in non-company pension schemes, and (c) company pension23
schemes should have higher funding ratios than non-corporate schemes.
If most funds switch a substantial portion of their assets from equities to bonds, this may have
macro-economic effects. While there do not appear to be any insurmountable macro-economic
problems (e.g. Exley, 2003), further research is needed on this question. Additional research is
also needed on various other issues - (a) the composition of the typical risk-minimising (or
liability-matching) portfolio, (b) the values of d, s, R and v for non-corporate schemes, where
these values may be substantially different from those for company schemes, (c) the procedures
used by trustees for setting d and s, (d) estimates of R, v, d and s, (e) whether there is conflict
over the asset allocation between the employer and the employees in non-corporate schemes, (f)
whether one group is dominant in determining the asset allocation, and (g) whether any persons,
apart from trustees, play a decisive role in setting the asset allocation (e.g. investment consultants
and fund managers).
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